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IN THE

SUPREME COCRT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appel'-ant,

v.

W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of
Financial Institutions; FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a bank
holding company; and FIRST SECURITY STATE BANK OF
SPRINGVILLE, an unincorporated
association,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

12636

BRIEF OF APPELLANT CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for judicial review of a decision and
order of defendant, W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Financial Institutions, approving the application of defendant, First Security Corporation, to establish a new unit
Bank in Springville, Utah. This action was consolidated
in the lower court with two other actions for review of the
same order of the Commissioner.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
lower court entered a judgment dismissing the
complamts of all plaintiffs below and upholding the order
of the Commissioner.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Central Bank & Trust Company seeks reversal of the
lower court's decision; an order against defendant Commissioner vacating the order of said Commissioner granting the application of First Security to organize a unit
Bank in Springville, Utah; and an order enjoining First
Security Corporation from operating a banking office in
Springville, Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 13, 1970, defendant, First Security Cor·
poration, filed v1ith W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Fi·
nancial Institutions, its application for permission to or·
ganize First Security State Bank of Springville in the
City of Springville, Utah. Protests to the granting of the
application were filed by plaintiff and Utah Valley Bank,
a proposed bank. A hearing on the application was held
on April 29, 30 and 31 of 1970. On August 5th, 1970, the '
Commissioner issued his Findings of Facts, Conclusion
and Order approving the application of First Security
Corporation. On September 4th, 1971, plaintiff filed a
complaint pursuant to Section 7-1-26 of the Utah
Annotated, 1953, as amended, for review of the
sioner's order. The action was consolidated for hearmg

with the cases of Child, et al. v. Brimhall and Child, et al.
v. First Security Corporation, et al. Trial was held for the
consolidated cases on April 15, 1971 before Judge Aldon J.
Anderson. On August 16, 1971, Judge Anderson issued a
judgment dismissing plaintiffs' respective complaints,
holding that the application of First S'ecurity Corporation
before the Commissioner was proper and valid, that no unlawful concentration of economic powers is created by the
establishment of First Security State Bank of Springville;
that First Security Corporation complied with the governing statutes of the State of Utah and that First Security Corporation constitutes a lawful de novo unit bank;
that said bank does not violate the branch banking statute of the State of Utah and that the decision of the Commissioner was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
The record of the proceedings before the Commissioner will be referred to as "TR-" and the record before
the lower court as "CT-".
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION HAS
ATTEMPTED TO CIRCUMVENT THE
BRANCH BANKING LAWS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A UNIT BANK IN SPRINGVILLE, UTAH,
WHERE A BRANCH COULD NOT BE
PLACED.
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Central Bank & Trust Company is a Utah
banking
. corporation with its home office in Springville
- a city of the second class. It is Central's position that
the establishment of a banking facility in Springville b
First Security Corporation - while in form a unit
- is in substance a branch and hence in violation of the
restrictions of Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
The pertinent provisions of Section 7-3-6 provide:
"The business of every bank shall be conducted
only at its banking house and every bank shall
receive deposits and pay checks only at its banking house except as hereinafter provided.

* * *

"Except in cities of first class, or within unincorporated areas of a county in which a city of the
first class is located, no branch bank shall be established in any city or town in which is located
a bank or banks, state or national, regularly tran·
sacting a customary banking business, unless the
bank seeking to establish such branch shall take
over an existing bank."

It is undisputed that Springville is a city of the second

class and that Central Bank is a bank regularly transact·
ing a customary banking business in Springville. Therefore under the statute the only way a branch can be ere·
'
ated in Springville is by taking over an existing bank.
Walker Bank v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P. 2d 592
(1964). This limitation applies both to state chartered
banks, ·walker Bank v. Taylor, supra, and to national
banks, First National Bank v. Walker Bank, 385 U. S.
252, 17 L. 2d 343.
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A branch is defined in Section 7-3-6 as follows:
"The term 'branch' as used in this act shall be held
to include any branch bank, branch office branch
additio_nal
or any branch
of
busmess at which deposits are received or checks
paid or money lent."
A branch office need not be denominated as such and the
court will look at all the facts to determine whether there
is in fact an additional office or place of business where
deposits are received, checks paid, or money lent. Continental Bank v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P. 2d 796
(1963). We submit that there can be no question that
the facility of Springville is an additional office or place
of business of First Security where all three of the statutory criteria are performed.

POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REGARDING FORM RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE
IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF
THE COMMISSIONER'S ORDER.
First Security's stock answer to the contention that
the new facility violates branch banking laws is that the
new facility is a unit bank and hence not a branch. But
the law is clear that a court will look at substance, not
form, in making such a determination. Continental Bank
v. Taylor, supra. In a case where a similar issue was
raised, this Court, citing Fletcher on Corporations stated:
"

courts will disregard the corporation or its
and look at the substance and reality of the
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matter." Clearfield State Bank v. Brimhall 24
Utah 2d 339, 471 P. 2d 161, 162 (1970).
'
In that case, the court held that it was not enough to
show common control through common stock ownership
and management participation to constitute a unit bank
a branch, but that "it must be shown that the alleged
branch is doing business with the alleged parent in the
same way as if the institutions were one, that it must be
shown that 'unitary type of operation' which is the hallmark of a branch bank is present" citing First National
Bank in Billings v. First Bank Stock Corporation, 306 F.
2d 937 (9th Cir. 1962). In that latter case, the court of
appeals stated the test as follows:
"They must show, that, in substance, Midland is
doing business through the instrumentality of Val·
ley, or vice versa, in the same way as if the insti·
tutions were one ... [citing cases] ... We do not
agree with the appellee that the fact that the two
banks are separate corporate organizations demon·
strates conclusively that one is not a branch of the
other. In the banking field as elsewhere, courts
have power to 'pierce the corporate veil' when the
realities require it."
We submit that on the facts established on the record,
realities require such a result.

POINT III.
THE RECORD CLEARLY ESTABLISHES
THAT FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION
Op ER ATES FIRST SECURITY STATE
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BANK OF SPRINGVILLE AS A BRANCH
OF THE FIRST SECURITY SYSTEM.
There can be no doubt that First Security is holding
out to the public that what it has established in Springville is not a $200,000 bank, but an additional office of a
"Billion Dollar Banking Organization" (Ex. P-1). That
exhibit details the financial condition, not of the unit
bank but of the First Security system. It states, "we
have plenty of money to lend" and infers that money
comes from the billion dollars of resources, not the $200,000
facility with a loan limit of $15,000 as required by 7-3-39,
U. C. A. (1953). It is submitted that First Security cannot have it both ways - advertising to the public of
Springville that an office of a billion dollar organization
is now operating in their community and arguing to the
Commissioner and to the court that it is a $200,000 unit
bank they have created.
Nor can there be any doubt that it is giving only lip
service to the requirements of Section 7-3-18, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as to stock ownership qualifications of
directors. First Security Corporation put up all the
money for the capital and surplus of the Springville operation and the four non-employee directors merely hold
qualifying shares which they must return when their tour
of duty expires. They paid no consideration for their
qualifying shares
91'. (CT. 2 2)
The manager of the facility was originally proposed
(TR. 119) to be the manager of the First Security office
in Payson. Actually employed was the assistant manager
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of First Security's branch office in Spanish Fork (CT.
. Both retain all the employee benefits, such as health
msurance, seniority and retirement prog:qiJ¥ they had at
Spanish Fork or Payson (TR. 182;
The record
shows First Security Company handles personnel matters
for all units in the system. All employee benefits are the
same no matter where an employee works and an employee can move from one office to another without any
change in his seniority or employee benefits (TR. 30).
Insurance protection is provided through a single group
policy held by First Security Corporation for all employees of all units of the system (TR. 39).

\B

The president of the theoretical unit bank is George
S. Eccles, who is also the president of First Security Corporation, Chairman of the Board of First Security Bank
of Utah, member of the Investment Committee of First
Security Company, as well as a director of First Security
Corporation, First Security Company, First Security
Bank of U U:h, First Security Bank
and of
First Security State Bank of Sprmgville (CT.
Springville's Vice President is Max Thomas, who is a vice
president and director of First Security Corporation (CT.
- \q.-6-67. Significantly Mr. Thomas is also supervisor of the
Southern Division of First Security system - the geo·
graphical area in which the facility is located. The South·
em Division is an administrative office that supervises
the
and practices of First Security in that area
The proposed banking facility will have only minimal
capitalization. All of the stock except the qualifying

shares of the directors will be owned by First Security
Corporation, the bank holding company (TR. 19). Even
those directors' shares will be subject to a repurchase
agreement (TR. 48-49), and the proposed directors who
evidenced an interest in a more substantial investment
were told to purchase shares of First Security Corporation (TR. 119).
The facility is and will be held out to the public as
part of the giant First Security system, without distinction as to its purported separate corporate character (TR.
58-59). It will be identified in the system's public relations advertising as another "First Security Bank". See
for example the advertisements which include the First
Security State Bank in Salt Lake City as part of the description of the services offered by "First Security Bank",
(prot. Ex. 2). These same type of advertisements will
be prepared by First Security Company for the new office
in the same manner and for the same purpose as its institutional advertising is handled for all the other
branches in the system (TR. 28-29).
And the facility will be operated in the same manner
as any other branch. With only a limited loan capacity,
any additional resources for Springville will have to come
out of the First Security system (TR. 91) as one of its
"independent" directors admitted. Mr. Thomas F.
Hawkes, vice president of First Security Corporation, vice
president of First Security Company, and a proposed
director of the new facility made clear the true nature
of its branch character (TR. 23-60). The First Security

10

is operated as an integrated unit with each branch
office functioning as part of a system managed, controlled
and supervised by an interrelated group of boards, com.
mittees and divisions. From bookkeeping to audit, from
new business solicitation to investments, each office is
part of a centralized whole (TR. 23-60). The name of the
new unit in Springville will be so like that of the other
First Security banks that a need was felt for a waiver
from the other Utah banks in the system (App. Ex. 2).
I ts advertising will be supervised by and generated
from First Security Company, whose advertising division
is headed by William L. Eccles, a vice president and di·
rector of First Security Bank of Utah, a vice president of
First Security Bank of Rock Springs, and of First Secur·
ity Company (TR. 28-31). It is clear from the testimony
of the witnesses and the examples of the advertisements
themselves (Prot. Ex. 2) that the advertising program of
First Security Company on behalf of all of the units in
the system is to create a common identity public image
for all of the units in the First Security system.
Marketing (new business) for the proposed new
facility will be supervised by First Security Company and
the Southern Division of the First Security Bank of Utah,
whose head is Max Thomas, a vice president and director
of that bank as well as of the First Security Corporation
(TR. 36-37) Such supervision will be conducted in
same manner as for other branches of the First Secunty
Bank of Utah in the general area, and the new manager
will report to Mr. Thomas (TR. 57) ·
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The new facility will be subject to the same supervision and control as other branches in the First Security
system through the internal audit and examination functions as First Security Company, a function performed
by that company for all units in the system, despite their
examination by different supervisory authorities, depending upon the technical nature of their incorporation. This
is the method whereby First Security Corporation maintains supervision and control of its 108 banking offices, at
least concerning the kind of things that would be disclosed by internal audit and examination (TR. 32).
First Security Company has an investment committee which makes the investment decisions for each of
the units in the system (TR. 34-46). Final say on investments for the proposed new unit will be in the hands of
George S. Eccles, whose numerous hats have already been
described (TR. 36). This same investment committee
makes the investment decisions for the offices of all four
has handled investments for
banks in the system,
the new facility
First Security Company will do the purchasing of
supplies and equipment for the new unit, in the same
manner as it does for other branches in the system (TR.
180).

First Security Company has established standardized
forms, procedures and rates for installment loans and
similar standardized policies and procedures for real estate loans for all branches in the system (TR. 40-45) · The
proposed Springville unit would be subject to these cen-
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trally established policies and procedures in the same
manner as other branches in the system (TR. 42). In
addition, First Security Corporation has a policy com.
mittee that makes basic policy decisions and establishes
policy for all units in the system, and would do so for the
Springville unit (TR. 44) .
The loan policy for real estate loans is set on a sys.
tern-wide basis (TR. 177) as are policy and procedures
for installment loans (TR. 177-78). The new facility will
handle BankAmericard transactions on which the obligee
is First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. (TR. 171).
The above facts clearly show the relationship between
First Security State Bank of Springville and First Secur·
ity is not limited to a case of common control through
stock ownership and management participation as was
present in Clearfield State Bank v. Brimhall, supra, but
rather is a case of First Security operating a branch bank
through the instrumentality of First Security State Bank
of Springville - a violation of Section 7-3-6, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, under the "unitary type of operation"
test set out in the Clearfield State Bank case.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7-3-6 DO
NOT APPLY TO BANK HOLDING COMPANIES.
First Security's defense to the fact that its Spring·
ville facility is operated as a branch of the First Security
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Corporation is that First Security Corporation is a bank
holding company, not a bank. Plaintiff would submit
that this is not a defense, but rather is the very issue before the court - whether a bank holding company is subject to the provisions of Section 7-3-6.
The Utah Supreme Court has said of Section 7-3-6:
"We are of the opinion that our statute is restrictive and, what it does not expressly permit, it prohibits." Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Taylor, supra, at 594.
There is no express provision in that statute or elsewhere
in the banking code authorizing a bank holding company
to establish additional de novo banking offices in a city
of the second class where there is already a bank doing
business.
U. C. A. 7-3-6, reinforced by the 1963 amendment to
Section 7-1-26, (Laws of Utah 1963, Chapter 7, Section
6) contains a provision preventing a unit bank from being
acquired by "another bank" for the purpose of establishing a branch until such unit bank shall have been in operation for a period of five years. Defendants apparently
fearing that this provision would prevent First Security
Corporation from acquiring a unit bank in Springville
applied for the charter itself, an inadvertent concession
the term "bank" in this provision includes holding companies. This conduct appears to be inconsistent with defendants' position that First Security is not subject to the
branching laws, as the five-year rule would not apply to
holding companies under their position. This court
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can plug this loophole by holding that a unit bank when
operated is just another banking office of a holding com.
pany system, is in fact a branch and subject to the limi.
tations of 7-3-6.
This approach is consistent with the statutory history of the state regulation of branch banking. From 1911
(Laws of Utah 1911, Chapter 25, Section 32) until 1933
(Laws of Utah 1933, Chapter 6), branch banking was
prohibited. The 1933 change, a part of a series of bills
(Laws of Utah 1933, Chapters 4 to 10), enacted to meet
the banking crisis of that year, allowed the more solvent
Banks to protect depositors of banks in trouble by acquir·
ing those banks through merger and branching the acquired bank. In an effort to protect existing banks in the
smaller towns such as Springville1 from the concentration
of economic power in the larger chain banks, the Legisla·
ture imposed two alternative conditions as to cities other
than Salt Lake if there was an existing bank in operation:
( 1) That a branch office could be established by taking
over an existing bank; or (2) a bank seeking to establish
a branch should obtain the consent of all other banks in
that locality. Laws of Utah, 1933, Chapter 6. This latter
condition was declared an unconstitutional delegation of
1rn Walker Bank v. Taylor, supra, at page 594, the court said:
"During the period between 1911 and 1933 the
was of the opinion that branch banking was not m the pubhc mterest,
possibly because it might impair the stability of existing banks. Thil
reasoning could well have influenced the
when_
saw
·t
t
allow
branch
banking
but
only
under
certam
restrictive
con·
fi
o
,
. .
that
ditions. This legislative history lends
to the
what our branch banking laws do not permit, they prohibit.
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legislative power in Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116
Utah 422, 211 P. 2d 190 (1949), but the take-over condition was reaffirmed in that case and in Walker Bank v.
Taylor, supra.
The legislative protective scheme would be frustrated
and subverted if, as here, a bank holding company could
establish an additional banking office merely by establishing a unit bank in form. Such a result would mean that
the three largest banks in the state - First Security,
Walker Bank & Trust Company, and Zions First National
Bank - all owned by bank holding companies, could establish additional offices in any city or town where there
existed a local unit bank, regardless of the restrictions of
Section 7-3-6. It would also mean that any other bank
desiring to expand into areas in which branch banking
is prohibited could conceivably do so by forming a bank
holding company. Whether statewide branch banking as such a result would create - is wise or unwise is a
matter for debate before the Legislature. Until such a
legislative decision is made, the public policy of the State
of Utah as to branching, on the books since 1933, should
not be subverted by the holding company device.
This court has taken recognition of this legislative
policy to restrict branch banking by its strict interpretation of §7-3-6. In Continental Bank v. Taylor, supra, the
court held a practice of Continental Bank of making automobile loans through insurance agents violated the branch
banking law and in Walker Bank and Trust Company v.
Taylor, supra, the court held the State Bank of Provo,
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though the only unit bank in Provo, could not establish a
branch
Defendants' position appears unsup.
portable m hght of these two decisions. To argue that
a holding company can establish a branch anywhere in
the state through the use of the unit bank form when the
State Bank of Provo could not establish a branch in Provo
is to argue for a result the legislature could never have
intended.
The intention of the legislature, to include within the
scope of §7-3 all forms of banking is made clear by
'vhich provides that provisions in Chapter 3 apply "t-0
all corporations transacting a banking business in this
state, unless the context otherwise requires." It cannot
be disputed that First Security Corporation is a corpora·
tion transacting a banking business through instrumen·
tality of its unit banks.
A good example of an attempt to subvert legislative
intent with regard to branch banking by the use of a hold·
ing company is Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans, 323 F. 2d 290 ( 1963) ; reversed solely on juris·
dictional grounds, 379 U. S. 411, 13 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1965),
where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held a new bank created through the use of a holding
company for the purpose of evading federal and state
statutes governing branch banking in Louisiana was a
prohibited branch bank. The Court in reaching the de·
cision relied on statements of the president of the parent
bank showing that the purpose of forming the new bank
was to evade branch banJrJng statutes.
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As in Whitney, the real purpose of establishing First
Security Bank of Springville was shown (TR. 53-54, TR.
130, 139-145) to be to obtain another banking office where
branching was prohibited.
POINT V.
TO EXEMPT BANK HOLDING COMPANIES FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 7-3-6 COULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL
ADVERSE EFFECT ON BANKING COMPETITION IN UTAH.
Because of its enormous effect on the economy, banking is a closely regulated industry on both the state and
national level. Legislation on both levels is designed to
insure competition within the banking structure. Under
the National Banking Act of 1933 (12 U.S. C. A. 36(c))
regulation of branching of national banks is left to the
states to avoid different laws for branching by national
and state banks. U. C. A. §7-3-6 prevents state banks from
branching in Springville, Walker Bank and Trust v. Taylor, supra, and prevents national banks from branching
in Springville. First National Bank v. Walker Bank, supra.
However the statute is silent with regard to holding companies placing upon this court the burden of laboring in
a vacuum as to whether holding companies are outside
this regulatory scheme as to branching. This court can
either judicially legislate that bank holding companies
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are not subject to branch banking legislation or can hold
that bank holding companies are subject to such legislation, leaving the legislature to decide whether bank holding companies should receive different treatment from
that accorded other banks. Central Bank Trust Company urges the court to follow the latter course to avoid
a result which would allow a whole area of banking to be
free from state regulation in an industry that the legislature regulates very closely to protect the public and to
insure banking competition.
The competitive advantage over other banks, which
bank holding companies would receive if not subject to
provisions of §7-3-6 is clear. Branch banking is a natural
way for a bank to grow and to increase its services. It
allows a bank to shift loan resources from one area to
another when a demand for credit varies. It allows a bank
to diversify its risks and to follow population changes..
If one group of banks could branch without restriction
while another group could not, the former group would
eventually become the dominant banks in the state. If
the group of banks having this competitive advantage are
banks owned by holding companies the danger of their
domination of Utah banking is even greater, as these
banks are already the largest banks in Utah. It appears
clear that the legislature did not intend to exclude bank
holding companies from the statute for to do so would
have the effect of defeating the very purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute.
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POINT VI.
TO INTERPRET SECTION 7-3-6 AS EXCLUDING FROM ITS COVERAGE BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES RAISES ISSUES
AS T 0 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 0 F
THE STATUTE.
There appears to be no logical reason for giving bank
holding companies the tremendous competitive advantage
which would result from their exclusion from the provisions of §7-3-6, and, therefore, such an interpretation may
make the statute subject to challenges as special or class
legislation or as denying equal protection of the law.
This court has stated that where a statute can be given
different reasonable interpretations, under one it would
be constitutional and the other its constitutionality would
be in doubt, the former will be adopted. Rothfels v.
Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P. 2d 612 (1960); Gord
v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P. 2d 449 (1967).
This is an additional reason to support the applicability
of the branch banking statute to holding companies.
CONCLUSION
Central Bank and Trust Company submits the differences between First Security State Bank of Springville
and a branch office of First Security are only of form.
The record shows beyond a doubt that First Security
Corporation intends to operate the de novo bank like a
branch of First Security system. First Security State
Bank of Springville is on paper a separate corporation.
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It files the paper forms and reports and is subject to separate examination as such. But form falls down when the
Springville office accepts deposits for one of the other
units of the system, which Mr. Allen admitted (CT. }6o 2
ffl . The receipt of deposits is one of the hallmarks of a
branch under the definition of Section 7-3-6. If form is
the test, the protective provisions of Section 7-3-6 can be
subverted by pieces of paper. To allow First Security
Corporation to evade prescriptions of this section solely
because it is a holding company would be to subvert the
clear legislative policy as to branch banking in the State
of Utah.

Central Bank cannot have a branch in Springville
because of the interpretation of Section 7-3-6 by our
Supreme Court in Walker Bank v. Taylor, supra. Should
that restriction be avoidable by its largest competitor
merely by the device of giving birth to a new "son" who
may be clothed as Esau but who in reality acts as Jacob?
The law provides that a statute should be interpreted
to uphold legislative policy and Central Bank & Trust
Company urges the court to do so in this case by holding
that Section 7-3-6 applies to holding companies, and that
First Security Corporation has violated that Section by
the establishment of First Security State Bank of Springville.
Respectfully submitted,
Peter W. Billings, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Attorney for Appellant
Central Bank & Trust
Company

